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束效应，以此来检测绑定假说对 A 股公司的有效性。 
结果发现：1、交叉上市提高了 A 股公司的内部控制水平。并且 AH 类型的
交叉上市比 AB 类型的交叉上市更能提高公司的内部控制水平。2、AH 类型的交
叉上市使 A 股公司更倾向于解聘业绩差的高管人员。而 AB 类型的交叉上市并不
会产生这方面的约束效应。但随着近几年中国会计准则向国际会计准则趋同等政
策的影响，AH 类型的交叉上市的这种约束效应被弱化。3、交叉上市可以使 A
股公司更少地进行盈余平滑，更及时地确认大额亏损。AB 类型和 AH 类型的交
叉上市在这方面的约束效应并无明显差异。总体结果表明，交叉上市对 A 股公
司是有约束效应的，并且 AH 类型的交叉上市的约束效应比 AB 类型的交叉上市
更大。因此，绑定假说对中国 A 股公司是有效的。 
 





























 As the economy globalization continuously proceeds，national boundaries are 
blurring into each other for more and more companies, to whom cross-listing has 
become a very important way of financing. There are various theories about the 
motivation of cross-listing, such as segmentation hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis, 
shareholder-base hypothesis and Visibility hypothesis. Among all, the bonding 
hypothesis assumes that companies can self-improve their corporate governance by 
cross-listing in stock exchanges with more rigorous requirements about standards, 
regulations or disclosure requirements. By “renting” the more rigorous mechanism 
about standards, regulations or disclosure requirements, these companies can mitigate 
the adverse effects such as expropriation of minority shareholders, management 
opportunism, and adverse selection, which are caused by weak investor protection 
from their original countries. This paper aims to draw a conclusion about the 
effectiveness of bonding hypothesis in the context of China by analyzing the bonding 
effects from three perspectives-internal control, management turnover and earnings 
management. 
This paper’s empirical results show that: for Chinese A shares, firstly, cross-listing 
can improve internal control. Moreover, the internal control improvement is more 
obvious for companies cross-listed in Hong Kong Security Market than those in B 
Share Market. Secondly, Companies cross-listed in Hong Kong Security market are 
more likely to terminate poorly performing management, while those cross-listed in B 
Share Security market exhibit no such pattern. However, as the accounting standards 
of Mainland China converge with International Accounting Standards, this kind of 
bonding effect became weaker in the last few years. Finally, cross-listing can induce 
companies to reduce earnings smoothing and recognize large loss in time. In this 
perspective, there is no difference between cross-listing in Hong Kong Security 

















Chinese A shares, and the effects are more obvious for companies cross-listed in Hong 
Kong Security market than those in B Share market, thereby proving that bonding 
hypothesis applies to Chinese A shares. 
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第一章  导论 
1 
 
第一章  导论 
本章从研究背景出发，阐明了本文的研究问题和研究意义，理清了本文的研
究框架，概括了本文的研究发现和主要贡献。 




1990 年底上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所才成立，1992 年开始就有 18 家上市
公司进行了 AB 类型的交叉上市①，截止 2010 年末，已有近 90 家公司实现了 AB
类型的交叉上市。境外方面，大部分中国上市公司选择了香港证券交易所作为交
叉上市的主要场所。从 1993 年 7 月青岛啤酒由 H 股回归 A 股，成为首家 AH 境
外交叉上市的公司后，AH 类型的交叉上市开始迅速发展。截止 2010 年末，已












                                                        
①交叉上市一般指跨境上市，双重上市指在两个交易所上市。AB 股和 AH 股的公司应是双重上市，许多学











































很多实证研究都证明了绑定假说，如 Stulz(1999)、Doidge et al.(2004)、Wojcik 
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